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Abstract 
The cattle beef activity appears in almost 75% Brazilian farms, becoming one of the main 
activities in rural areas, according to IBGE (2012). The production runs, on average, for 3 
years (finishing cow-calf), and for this reason, it is essential to agricultural enterprises the 
standpoint of property. It is also an essential component of the cash flow properties, 
generating the necessary liquidity to enable all the activities within them. Feedlot arises as a 
great alternative to intensify production. Investments in feedlot depend on the economic 
sustainability because it requires intensive capital and involves greater risks of production and 
marketing. By the side of the industry with the expansion of the consumer market is need to 
provide quality meat, standardized and continuously, making this sector seek partnerships and 
contracts with cattle`s suppliers. Because of these risks and the uncertainty of the trade, the 
use of contracts between producers and beef industry has been growing in the last years. 
Regarding the uncertainty of the agents, according to the New Institutional Economics, is not 
possible to predict all the events surrounding the transactions; this way, the contracts are 
incomplete (imperfect). This article aims to analyze the determinants of contract between 
producers and slaughterhouses in Brazil. The data used to make this analysis were 669 
questionnaires with Feedlots in the states of Goiás, Mato Grosso and Sao Paulo in Brazil. It 
was used the Tobit model to determine the main factors determining the use of contracts. The 
choice of the model mentioned occurs because the dependent variable (contract) take many 
values equal to zero. And this type of data leads to a corner solution very common in 
economics. Therefore the choice of the above model (Wooldridge, 2009). The results show 
that the variables cattle, meals (cost), machines, distance and prizes were statistically 
significant at 1%, and that the hypotheses H0, H1, H2 and H3 can’t be rejected. That is when 
the greatest level of technology adopted, as well as the increased risk of production and cattle 
size, there is a quest for realization of contract between Feedlot cattle and beef industry. 
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Already the hypotheses H5 were rejected. The market price doesn’t interfere in the use of 
contracts. 
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1. Introduction 
Historically, Brazil has been a major producer of cattle beef. In the last 5 years it has 
become the largest exporter of the meat. According to FAO (2012), 1 in 4 kg of cattle beef 
sold in the world is Brazilian. The exported volume exceeds 2.4 million t, generating 
resources in excess of $ 4 billion. This number accounts for roughly 20% of national 
production. The total volume of resources handled by the sale of cattle beef in Brazil exceeds 
the 10 billion dollars per year. 
The Brazilian beef chain presents some problems related to the heterogeneity of 
production and processing (capitalized farmers and small producers; slaughterhouses with 
high technological standard and illegal slaughter, etc), lack of coordination between the links 
(conflicts in relationships) and influences of the institutional environment as a mediator of the 
problems in this chain  (Benitez, 2000; Caleman & Zylberstajn, 2010). 
The cattle beef activity appears in almost 75% Brazilian farms, becoming one of the 
main activities in rural areas, according to IBGE (2012). The production runs, on average, for 
3 years (finishing cow-calf), and for this reason, it is essential to agricultural enterprises the 
standpoint of property. It is also an essential component of the cash flow properties, 
generating the necessary liquidity to enable all the activities within them. 
The weak point of this success that has been highlighted is how to sustain this growth 
since the restrictions on land and climate appear not only in Brazil, but in the entire planet. 
The growth of international consumption and the need to preserve the Amazon have shown 
that land need to increase productivity. The Brazilian beef cattle production occupies the 
largest slice of Brazil's arable land and is losing space for other agricultural activities. 
Furthermore in Brazil, in certain periods of the year, the climate impacts in lower pasture 
production and consequently lower production of meat. 
In this way, beef cattle need to increase land productivity and periods between 
harvests. Feedlot arises as a great alternative to intensify production. Investments in feedlot 
depend on the economic sustainability because it requires intensive capital and involves 
greater risks of production and marketing. By the side of the industry with the expansion of 
the consumer market is need to provide quality meat, standardized and continuously, making 
this sector seek partnerships and contracts with cattle`s suppliers. 
Because of these risks and the uncertainty of the trade, the use of contracts 
between producers and beef industry has been growing in the last years. This little 
used tool in the recent past and this sector has been gaining ground among 
producers, especially among the feedlots, that see in the expansion of the market a 
chance to qualify their flock and ensure the return of your investment. 
 
2. Literature 
 
2.1 Beef Cattle 
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The growth of national beef production is reaching higher rates compared to the past 
due to an increase in productivity. In Table 1, it can be observed the Brazilian beef production 
evolution, which exceeded 9 million tons on carcass equivalent in 2009. In the last 13 years 
(1996 to 2009), the production increased 53.7%, according to the Brazilian National Beef 
Cattle Council (CNPC, 2012). 
Analyzing the herd for the past 13 years, it is noticeable that the cattle number 
increased up to 37 million head, measured by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE) and published by the Association of Brazilian Beef Exporters (ABIEC), 
showing an increase of 27.3% per year. 
The average productivity in kg/cow/year increased by 27.51% (Table 1). The rate of 
increase in this period was 2.2% per year, 2007 being the most outstanding as the national 
productivity registered a 5.83% raise when compared to the previous year. 
 
Table 1. Total meat production in Brazil, total beef cattle herd and productivity, geometric 
growth rates and coefficient of determination, 1997 to 2009. 
Year 
Beef cattle Herd Total Production Productivity 
(million head) (thousand tons eq. carcass) (kg/herd/year) 
1997 156.1 5,820 37.28 
1998 157.8 6,040 38.28 
1999 159.2 6,270 39.38 
2000 164.3 6,650 40.47 
2001 170.6 7,151 41.92 
2002 179.2 7,540 42.08 
2003 189.1 7,792 41.21 
2004 197.8 8,488 42.91 
2005 200.3 8,776 43.81 
2006 199.1 9,053 45.47 
2007 193.2 9,297 48.12 
2008 191.2 9,000 47.07 
2009 193.1 9,180 47.54 
GGR 2.02 4,28 2.21 
R
2
 0.8392 0.9626 0.9145 
Source: CNPC, 2012 
 
On the other hand, in border regions, the expansion and consolidation of the beef cattle 
sector can be explained, mainly throughout the last years, by the diffusion of advanced 
technologies in genetics, nutrition, management and health. As a result, there was a raise in 
the sector productivity, transforming the national cattle farming into a competitive activity. 
Beef production is spread throughout the national territory, but more intensely in the central 
and southern regions of the country. The states of Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso do Sul, Goiás 
and Mato Grosso have the highest number of herds, representing 37% of the national total. 
On the other hand, the states with a higher relevance in slaughter activity are located in the 
central and western regions, where there are small consumer centers and big meat producers. 
The excess from those states are sent especially to São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, which are 
the main consumer centers. 
 4 
The price per arroba increased in the last 12 years. However, there were some periods 
with a significant amount of benchmark fluctuations, either because of the consumer market, 
or the production sector, which slaughtered many reproductive animals and reduced supplies. 
It is well known that the price variable is highly determining in the investment analysis and 
risk management. 
The period between January 1997 and December 2011 registered a price increase of 
21.8% within the state of São Paulo, as observed in Figure 1. On the one hand, a big 
fluctuation was recorded, as the one in 1999, when the arroba reached one of its peaks due to 
the depreciation of the Brazilian Real to the US dollar, which allowed more sales and 
consequently price increase. On the other hand, in 2006 prices were the lowest with regard to 
the previous 50 years. Finally, the highest price since 1994 was in 2010, when the domestic 
market, with growing income, demanded large quantities of meat, increasing the product 
value (Carvalho and DE ZEN, 2010). 
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Figure 1. Finished cattle cash prices in R$/arroba within the state of São Paulo from Jul/94 to 
Dec/11, deflated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) (Basis = Dec/2011). 
Source: Cepea/Esalq-USP, 2012 
 
Regarding the consumer market for beef in Brazil, distinguished two niches. The first 
is formed by low-income consumers, whose main decision variable in choosing the product is 
the price. The second niche market corresponds to the group of consumers with high 
purchasing power, focused primarily on product quality (Carvalho & De Zen, 2010). 
Thereby the Brazilian beef chain is characterized by its complexity and diversity. The 
demand for quality products with traceability is related to healthy, social and environment 
concerns. For that an efficient coordination between industry and production should be 
accomplished. This new context imposes challenges to this sector. The processing industries, 
mainly those oriented to the international market, develop Quality Programs that, in last 
instance, represent a private initiative for carcasses classification and standardization. These 
programs aim to incentive the production of standardized animals in order to attend industrial 
processes optimization and consumer demand for quality. Compensations are given to cattle 
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growers as a form of incentives in order to have animal carcasses with some attributes related 
to beef quality (Caleman & Zylberstajn, 2010). 
 
2.2 Feedlot 
The Brazilian cattle production has always been characterized by extensive system 
(pasture). Currently, with the incorporation of new technologies to increase productivity, there 
is intensive production systems in some regions, most known as feedlot (use feeds, main 
grains). In this system the animal remains for about 90 days in the fattening ration being 
treated with high protein and energy feed reaching a mean weight gain of 1.5 kg/day. 
This system has been gaining importance in Brazil in the last decade. Figure 2 shows 
the number of animals confined evolution in the country in twelve years. The growth is 
observed with fluctuations in some years due to low prices paid to the animal and feed costs 
high. In 2012 the total number of confined animals was 3.9 million, which represents only 2% 
of the total herd Brazil. 
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Figure 2. Number of cattle in feedlots - Brazil. 
Source: Assocon & Beefpoint (2013) 
 
 An important point of feedlot production in Brazil is the largest supply of animals in 
the second half of the year when traditionally there is a lower supply of pastures due to 
climate and consequently the number of animals. Thus becomes an important regulatory 
mechanism in price between industry and producer. The importance of confinement is 
observed in figure 3 which shows the total number of animals slaughtered and the 
participation of animals from confinement. The share of this production system in total 
slaughter reaches 25% in the months from August to November. 
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Figure 3. Number of feedlot’s animal slaughtered in the total of Brazilian slaughter – millions 
of herds. 
Source: Assocon (2013) 
 
However as previously described this system is still in the growth stage in 
Brazil representing a small share of beef production and with the use of contracts 
between producers and industry still small. A example for the country both in this 
production system so with the coordination of the chain is the U.S. 
Since the late eighties, the size of the North American feedlots increased while the 
quantity is reduced, gaining economies of scale in cattle feed - about 2% of feedlots fatten 
85% of all livestock in the country finishing stage (International Livestock Congress, 2002 
apud Brocklenbank et al., 2008). Gains are checked in purchases of inputs for livestock feed 
(Barkema et al., 2001 apud Brocklebank et al., 2008) and ownership of technologies that 
reduce the variable costs of production, including feed efficiency programs, new protocols for 
health management and treatment system, electronic identification of animals - also improved 
the efficiency of the management system (Brester, 2002 apud Brocklebank et al., 2008). 
The coordination of the beef market in the United States was characterized by a 
movement out of the spot market to expand into different market structures, with contracts, 
strategic alliances (with other links in semen production and calves) and vertical integration. 
Coordination in the spot market is low, transactions are conducted by numerous buyers and 
sellers from a single determinant - the price (Hobbs; 1996 apud Brocklebank et al.; 2008).  
The contracts have been typically used by processors / packers and the feedlot. Its 
growth has motivated the search for the reasons for this growth by Lawrence et al. (2001), 
The processing companies are motivated to perform contracts with the feedlot as a tool to 
ensure the quality of meat that can then establish contracts based on specific attributes with 
dealers. Economies of scale are also observed due to the flow of slaughter can be maintained 
near full capacity (Brocklebank et al., 2008). 
The first incentives for the establishment of contracts by the feedloters are to ensure 
premium quality and get better prices by carcass of the animal sold. Differential pricing by 
type of carcass allows feedlots identify the problem areas and make adjustments to achieve 
the desired levels of price premium. The establishment of contracts allows feedlots have 
guaranteed capacity and stable prices, allowing management efforts are conducted with 
animal production (Hayenga et al.; 2000 apud Brocklenbank et al.; 2008). 
 
2.3 Theory 
 
Regarding the uncertainty of the agents, according to the New Institutional 
Economics, is not possible to predict all the events surrounding the transactions; this way, the 
contracts are incomplete (imperfect). The uncertainty changes the knowledge on future 
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transactions. This aggravates the problem of incompleteness of contracts. Thus, changes the 
choice of more efficient governance structure adopted by the firm. 
According to Williamson (1971), uncertainty is one of the characteristics of the 
transaction. This author defines the governance structure as a mechanism of 
adaptation in the task of transacting; being that the organizational structure varies 
according to certain characteristics of these transactions, such as: i) asset specificity, 
ii) frequency and iii) uncertainty. The specification of the asset (investment) can 
define the degree of stiffness of the contractual relationship; greater asset specificity 
means that it has a unique function that cannot be modified without costs, ie when 
the specific asset is being incurred higher begin to develop new forms of rigid 
contract. The frequency of transactions can be classified as occasional or recurrent. 
Uncertainty is the third dimension of an economic transaction; conditions of 
uncertainty comes from possible opportunistic behavior after the drafting of the 
contract. May result in unexpected behavior even during the execution of this 
contract. 
As in the instance of the contract between  the Feedlot cattle and the meat industry, the 
uncertainty of the market (supply and demand) is what leads the agents to seek this kind of 
relationship. Despite many differences that occurs between production systems in a country 
with continental proportions as Brazil, the most widely used commerce system is still 
traditional price contract over the counter on the day of last judgment of sale. The last sense 
of Assocon (National Feedlot Association) showed that only 28% and 17% of confinements in 
Mato Grosso and Sao Paulo, respectively, used contracts to negotiate cattle with the industry. 
The use of the sense is used as a parameter for judging the proportion of farmers involved in 
marketing. This is due to the fact that producers are used as a tool of containment finishing 
animals, have a more technical manpower, a more professional system as a whole. 
When analyzing the issue of specific assets, Lafontaine (2007) shows that 
some empirical tests are not designed to identify the precise nature of specificity. 
Instead they test for its presence in more general terms. To illustrate, one study 
(Weiss 1992) assesses residual correlation of share–price returns, under the 
hypothesis that, when specificity is important, shocks to one firm will affect the other 
in the same direction. In the case of Brazilian feedlots, this can occur when the 
producer ranges a level of standardization that the slaughterhouse wants. In this 
case, the producer can receive a prize for the herd quality. 
 
3. Goal 
 
This article aims to analyze the determinants of contract between producers 
and slaughterhouses in Brazil. 
 
4. Methodology 
 
The data used to make this analysis were 669 questionnaires with Feedlots in the states 
of Goiás, Mato Grosso and Sao Paulo in Brazil (Cepea / Assocon). It was used the Probit, 
Logit and Tobit models to test and determine the main factors determining the use of 
contracts. The choice of the model mentioned occurs because the dependent variable 
(contract) take many values equal to zero. And this type of data leads to a corner solution very 
common in economics. To test the hypothesis we used a Logit econometric model, considered 
appropriate for cases with discrete binary dependent variable. The dependent variable is the 
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contractual arrangement observed in each transaction, and the transaction carried out by 
contractual arrangement 0 if the contract between producer and industry and 1 case otherwise 
Therefore the choice of the above model (Wooldridge, 2009). The program to run the 
model described above was Stata. 
  
Contract = β0 + β1icattle + β2idistance + β3imachines +  β5iprize + ui 
Where: 
Contract: 0 if no contract between producer and industry and 1 case otherwise 
Cattle: The amount of livestock in confinement 
Distance: distance between the farm and industry 
Machines: number of machines used in the feedlot 
Prize: Prize paid by industry for the quality of cattle 
 
The hypotheses to be tested are: 
H0: the larger of the herd, the more risk and greater use of contracts; 
H1: The greater the technology employed (machinery), greater use of contract; 
H2: the greater the distance between the farm and industry, the greater is the use of contract; 
H3: if there receiving prize for quality, there is use of contract. 
 
5. Results 
 
The survey along the feedlot in the São Paulo, Mato Grosso and Goiás   
states, reached a total of 669 producers and together have 1,256,171 animals in 
2009, representing 40% of the total animals in Brazilian feedlots. The analysis of the 
survey data showed that only about 30% of interviewed (farmers) used the contract 
to negotiate the animal with industry, and that these producers have 79% of the 
animals, ie, 990.851 animals are negotiated via contract with industry. 
 Below there are tables 2, 3 and 4 with the results of Probit, Logit and Tobit 
models, respectively, which were run to related the variables cattle, prize, distance 
and machines with the use of the contract. The best results found were for the Tobit 
model, which can be observed in Table 4. 
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Tabela 2. Results of Probit Regression 
Number of obs = 669
Pseudo R2 = 0.3343
contract Coef Std. Err. z P>[z]
cattle 0.000593*** 0.0000588 10.09 0.000 0.0004777 0.000708
prize 0.258*** 0.0704751 3.66 0.000 0.1196515 0.3959089
distance 0.000620* 0.0003597 1.72 0.085 -0.0000851 0.001325
machines 0.0180 0.0115037 1.57 0.117 -0.0045055 0.0405882
_cons -1.602*** 0.1321048 -12.12 0.000 -1.860.449 -1.342.608
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
[95% Conf. Interval]
 
Source: Results of model 
 
 
Tabela 3. Results of Logit Regression 
Number of obs = 669
Pseudo R2 = 0.3372
contract Coef Std. Err. z P>[z]
cattle 0.00109*** 0.000119 9.17 0.000 0.0008578 0.0013243
prize 0.457*** 0.1367981 3.34 0.001 0.1889379 0.7251766
distance 0.00113* 0.0006297 1.79 0.073 -0.0001041 0.0023644
machines 0.0273 0.0194041 1.41 0.160 -0.0107669 0.0652956
_cons -2.748*** 0.24257 -11.33 0.000 -3.223.678 -2.272.821
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
[95% Conf. Interval]
 
Source: Results of model 
 
Tabela 4. Results of Tobit Regression 
  
Number of obs = 669
Pseudo R2 = 0.1019
contract Coef Std. Err. z P>[z]
cattle 0.000057*** 8.80E-06 6.48 0.000 0.0000397 0.0000743
prize 0.171*** 0.0390256 4.39 0.000 0.0945339 0.2477904
distance 0.000168 0.0003124 0.54 0.073 -0.0004454 0.0007816
machines 0.0416*** 0.0089519 4.64 0.000 0.0240008 0.0591557
_cons -1.033*** 0.1313531 -7.87 0.000 -1.291 -0.7754302
/sigma 1.089*** 0.0665049 0.9584454 1.219
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
[95% Conf. Interval]
 
Source: Results of model 
 
The results show that the variables cattle, machinery and prizes were statistically 
significant at 1%. So, the hypotheses H0, H1 and H3 can’t be rejected. That is when the 
greatest level of cattle quality, as well as the increased risk of production and cattle size, there 
is a quest for realization of contract between feedlot cattle and beef industry. As the 
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machinery, the greatest level of technology adopted interfere in the use of contracts. However 
the hypotheses H2 is rejected. The greatest of the distanced adopted doesn’t interfere in the 
use of contracts. 
The results found show that the increase of one unit of the prize, there is a increase of 
0.17 units in the use of contract. The results are similar with that happens in the activity in the 
United States, where the use of the contract between producers and industry happens for 
additional pay for quality and standardized meat. 
 
6. Conclusions. 
 
The focus of the article was to identify the determinants of the choice of arrangements 
contatuais transaction between the processor - beef producer confined in the three producing 
states in Brazil. To understand the dynamics of the transaction, as regards existing contractual 
arrangements were analyzed as the size of the transaction (specific assets: cattle, prize, 
distance, machines) that generally influence the formation of a contractual arrangement, based 
on the economics of Transaction Costs. 
Identified the variables that determine the choice of contractual arrangements, through 
statistical analysis (Logit, Probit and Tobit).The analysis of the survey data showed that only 
about 30% of interviewed (farmers) used the contract to negotiate the animal with industry, 
and that these producers have 79% of the animals, ie, 990.851 animals are negotiated via 
contract with industry.   
The results show that the variables cattle, machinery and prizes were statistically 
significant at 1%. In general, this study indicates that investments in specific assets (cattle, 
prize, distance, machines), The dynamics of transaction feedlot beef depend on the variables 
in stratified hypothesis (H0: H1: H2: H3), is important to emphasize that in this work only the 
H2 was rejected (the greater the distance between the farm and industry, the greater is the use 
of contract). The results found show that the increase of one unit of the prize, there is a 
increase of 0.17 units in the use of contract. 
Finally, we conclude a transaction more likely to align with the contractual 
arrangement according to specificities of the assets involved in the production (cattle, prize, 
machines). Longer distance between the producer and the processor (greater locational, 
specificity) did not influence the formation of the contract, ie, the distance is not relevant to 
the formation of a contractual arrangement. 
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